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ARTICLES
UNMASKING THE CONSUMER PRIVACY OMBUDSMAN
Laura N. Coordes*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2015, RadioShack, then in bankruptcy, sold its brand name and cus-
tomer data to hedge fund affiliate General Wireless for approximately $26
million.1 Customer data was by far RadioShack’s most valuable asset; as
one commentator put it, “RadioShack’s [customer] database is the com-
pany.”2 A sale of the RadioShack name without the customer data would be
vastly less valuable, because the purchaser would have to start afresh in
ascertaining the identities of RadioShack’s customer base. Yet, a sale of
customer data also violated RadioShack’s privacy policy.3 In order to pro-
tect RadioShack’s customers, the bankruptcy court ordered the appointment
of a “consumer privacy ombudsman” (“CPO”) to “provide . . . information
to assist the court in its consideration of the facts, circumstances, and condi-
tions of the proposed sale.”4 Ultimately, with the CPO’s support, Radi-
* Associate Professor, Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law. I thank
the Montana Law Review for the opportunity to present this Article at the Browning Symposium on
Consumer Law. Thanks also to Chris Bradley for very helpful comments and Cole Cribari for excellent
research assistance.
1. Reuters, Bankruptcy Judge Approves Sale of RadioShack Name and Data, N.Y. TIMES (May
21, 2015), https://perma.cc/XH6G-XGFS.
2. Larry Dignan, FTC’s Take on the RadioShack Customer Data Appropriate (For Now), ZDNET
(May 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/6DVG-JLFN.
3. See Zack Whittaker, RadioShack Sale of Customers’ Personal Data May be Unlawful, Warns
FTC, ZDNET (May 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/4VR8-YMYZ (noting that RadioShack had promised
“not to sell or rent” the consumer data it collected).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 332(b) (2018).
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oShack was able to reach a resolution that limited the amount and type of
data sold.5
A CPO can play an important role in a bankruptcy case such as Radi-
oShack’s by suggesting ways a sale of customer data can occur with mini-
mal harm to consumers and in a way that accords with the debtor’s own
privacy policy and applicable non-bankruptcy laws.6 Since a retail debtor’s
customers are typically not parties in the bankruptcy case, the CPO steps in
to protect their privacy interests during a bankruptcy sale. In practice, bank-
ruptcy courts look to the CPO to determine whether a sale of customer data
can proceed, giving the CPO (and the report the CPO produces for the
court) deference and sometimes even refusing to approve a sale until the
CPO’s conditions for that sale have been fulfilled.7
In spite of the important role the CPO is asked to play, the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code devotes very little space to CPOs. The Code contains virtually
no guidance as to how CPOs are to perform their roles and only one qualifi-
cation for the CPO position: CPOs must be “disinterested,”8 meaning,
broadly speaking, that they must not have an interest adverse to a party in
the bankruptcy by virtue of their relationship with or connection to the
debtor.9
This Article takes a closer look at CPOs—who they are and who they
should be. It contrasts the important role CPOs are asked to play in the
protection of customer data with the relative lack of attention paid to the
CPO’s appointment in a bankruptcy case. And it suggests the appointment
of a qualified CPO—someone who, among other things, is an expert in
privacy law—is critical to the protection of consumer privacy interests.
The scholarly literature on CPOs is nearly as sparse as the Bankruptcy
Code’s treatment of them. Only a handful of articles discuss the CPO in
depth,10 and few have given much treatment to the CPO’s qualifications for
5. Report of the Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, In re Radioshack Corp., Case No. 15-10197
(May 16, 2015) at 23 (“The Ombudsman was supportive of [the mediation] process and believes the
outcome appropriately balances the privacy rights of consumers with the economic interests of the Debt-
ors’ estates.”).
6. Michael St. Patrick Baxter, The Sale of Personally Identifiable Information in Bankruptcy, 27
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2018).
7. See, e.g., In re Borders, discussed in Part III.A, infra; Report of the Consumer Privacy
Ombudsman, In re Sharper Image Corp., No. 08-10322 (KG), 2008 WL 2337300 (Bankr. D. Del. May
27, 2008) (stating debtor’s proposed transfer of customer mailing lists was inconsistent with debtor’s
privacy policies and ordering debtor to destroy some PII).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 332(a).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
10. Baxter, supra note 6 (discussing how the debtor and buyer may seek to avoid a CPO’s appoint-
ment due to high administrative costs); Warren E. Agin, Handling Customer Data in Bankruptcy Merg-
ers and Acquisitions: Coping with the Consumer Privacy Ombudsman Provisions of BAPCPA, 24-AUG
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1 (2005) (discussing guidelines for “personally identifiable information” and point-
ing out ambiguity in the CPO’s role due to the statutory language); Warren E. Agin, Reconciling the
2
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the role.11 In fact, many of the existing articles were written by CPOs them-
selves.12 CPOs have and will continue to play important roles in protecting
consumer privacy, yet there is minimal discussion of them in either the
Bankruptcy Code or the academic literature. However, much of the litera-
ture discussing CPOs calls for them to play larger and more defined roles
than they do now.13
In seeking to address these gaps in the literature, this Article proceeds
as follows. Part II explains how and why companies sell customer data in
bankruptcy, highlighting both the associated risks and the Bankruptcy
Code’s response to those risks. Part III examines the use of CPOs in bank-
ruptcy cases and assesses the lack of scrutiny of their qualifications. It then
proposes that explicit guidelines be issued for CPO qualifications. These
guidelines could come from a number of potential sources and will help to
minimize any potential for abuse inherent in the current statutory scheme.
Part IV concludes by emphasizing why it will be increasingly important for
FTC Act with the Consumer Privacy Ombudsman’s Role, 29-OCT AM. BANKR. INST. J. 38 (2010) (argu-
ing that the Bankruptcy Code provides insufficient guidance for CPOs); John R. Clemency & Keriann
M. Atencio, Keeping Up with Technology: Section 332 and the Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, 25-
SEP AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28 (2006) (discussing § 332, its implications for the bankruptcy process, and
its initial implementation in an Arizona bankruptcy court); Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer
Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C.L. REV. 423 (2018) (proposing that CPOs be appointed
in all Article 9 transactions when the secured party seeks to enforce its rights against consumer data, in
addition to bankruptcy proceedings involving the transfer of customer data); Cassandra M. Porter, Con-
fessions of a Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, 9 NO. 6 LANDSLIDE 30 (2017) (arguing that CPOs have
been beneficial to the bankruptcy sale process); Luis Salazar, Don’t Fear the Consumer Privacy
Ombudsman, 26-JAN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 42, 63 (2008) (pointing out that the CPO has been “easily
integrated” into the § 363 quick sale process); Kayla Siam, Coming to a Retailer Near You: Consumer
Privacy Protection in Retail Bankruptcies, 33 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 487 (2017) (arguing that the
Bankruptcy Code should include stronger consumer privacy guidelines by giving CPOs more oversight
and requiring the appointment of a CPO in any case where a business is likely to sell customer informa-
tion); Lucy L. Thomson, Personal Data for Sale in Bankruptcy: A Retrospective on the Consumer
Privacy Ombudsman, 34-JUN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32 (2015) (exploring the impact of the CPO’s crea-
tion and challenges moving forward).
11. The only articles that discuss the CPO’s qualifications in any depth devote only a few
paragraphs to them. Jessica D. Gabel, CSI Las Vegas: Privacy, Policing, and Profiteering in Casino
Structured Intelligence, 3 UNLV GAMING L.J. 39, 51 (2012) (asserting that “it seems only logical that
the court would prefer a candidate with a robust background in consumer privacy law” and that
“[i]deally, the appointed ombudsman would have familiarity specific to the debtor’s business and indus-
try practices related to privacy”); Roland L. Trope & E. Michael Power, Lessons in Data Governance: A
Survey of Legal Developments in Data Management, Privacy and Security, 61 BUS. LAW. 471, 503
(2005) (arguing that “a bankruptcy court would find it prudent, when ordering the appointment of a
[CPO], to include in such order that the appointee meet specified criteria that could reasonably include
expertise in privacy law”).
12. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 6 (identifying the author as the CPO in the Borders and BPS
Holdings bankruptcy cases); Thomson, supra note 10 (identifying the author as the CPO in 16 federal
bankruptcy cases); Porter, supra note 10, at 32 (identifying the author as the CPO in In re Golfsmith
International Holdings Inc.).
13. See, e.g., Agin, Handling, supra note 10; Agin, Reconciling, supra note 10; Elvy, supra note
10; Siam, supra note 10.
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CPOs to be privacy experts in light of the changing landscape of privacy
law.
II. CONSUMER DATA SALES IN BANKRUPTCY
Over the past forty years, advances in technology have made it increas-
ingly easy for businesses to collect customer information.14 Nearly every
firm, from data giants (such as Facebook and Amazon), to large retailers
(such as RadioShack), to small businesses, collects consumer data in the
course of conducting business.15 In doing so, these companies maintain that
the collection of customer data allows them to improve customer experi-
ence, provide better services, and generate ad revenue through targeted ad-
vertising.16 In the United States, companies spent almost $20 billion in one
year alone in their efforts to acquire and analyze customer data.17
In response to consumers’ discomfort with the collection of their per-
sonal information, companies developed privacy policies, many of which
assured customers that their data would never be shared with third parties.18
These privacy policies made representations to customers, giving them a
sense of how their data would be handled. However, recognition of the
value of customer data has created an environment where firms may seek to
ignore or circumvent those privacy policies in order to maximize value.19
Because data tends to be a highly valuable asset for most companies, in the
context of a bankruptcy sale, tensions between the desire to maximize the
business’s value for a potential buyer and compliance with privacy policies
come to the fore.
There are many reasons a company might seek to sell customer data in
bankruptcy. In some cases, the sale of such data is necessary or desirable so
the purchasing company can continue to serve customers as part of the busi-
14. Sarah Schmidt, How Technology is Changing Market Research, MARKETRESEARCH.COM (Mar.
17, 2016), https://perma.cc/7T3D-D2HJ (“Technology is increasingly enabling integration of data col-
lection.”) (quoting Steve August, Chief Innovation Officer of FocusVision Worldwide).
15. See William Goddard, How Do Big Companies Collect Customer Data?, ITCHRONICLES, https:/
/perma.cc/TX4D-NYAW (“[C]ollecting customer data has become a major priority for businesses.”).
16. Id. (“With customer data, companies can improve customer experiences, refine marketing strat-
egies, conduct hyper-targeted advertising, and even create new revenue streams by selling data (if they
collect enough of it) to data companies.”).
17. Carl Wedoff & David P. Saunders, Big Data Meets Bankruptcy, 39-JUL AM. BANKR. INST. J.
14, 14 (2020).
18. See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Announces Settlement with Bankrupt
Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy Violations (July 21, 2000), https://perma.cc/
QM38-HXB6 regarding (providing that Toysmart’s privacy policy stated that customers’ “personal in-
formation would never be shared with third parties”) (emphasis in original).
19. Id. (“Customer data collected under a privacy agreement should not be auctioned off to the
highest bidder.”) (quoting Jodie Bernstein, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection).
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ness.20 Warren Agin has used the example of an airline who is selling its
assets to a competing carrier. The purchaser needs customer information in
order to honor the airline tickets issued by the seller.21 In addition, like
anything else a company might sell, customer data is an asset. In some
cases, customer data may be the most valuable asset the company has.22
As much as a company might want or need to sell customer data, there
are risks involved as well. Companies must make sure the data they are
selling was legally collected and held, and they cannot violate non-bank-
ruptcy privacy laws, such as the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(“COPPA”) or the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLB”).23 If courts restrict
the sale of data because of a party’s failure to comply with a privacy law or
policy, the restriction can significantly decrease the value of the petitioning
company’s remaining assets and jeopardize the sale.24
The risks of selling customer data are only likely to grow as jurisdic-
tions adopt new privacy laws.25 For example, the California Consumer Pri-
vacy Act (“CCPA”) allows consumers to hold corporations liable for viola-
tions of their privacy guidelines and takes a broad view of what information
constitutes “private data.”26 To some extent, some risks can be mitigated
well in advance of any sale, through careful drafting of the privacy policy.27
Still, firms cannot always predict changes in privacy laws or the identity of
potential buyers, and therefore there is always some risk that a sale of cus-
tomer data will violate the company’s privacy policy, another privacy law,
or both.
A. The Toysmart Settlement
The tensions described above were evident in 2000, when the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) sued now-defunct Toysmart.com, LLC (“Toys-
20. See Marshall J. Hogan, Customer Data Sale in Bankruptcy: Lessons From RadioShack, FO-
LEY.COM (2015), https://perma.cc/U3M6-KEM4.
21. Agin, Handling, supra note 10, at 60.
22. Paula Rosenblum, Bankrupt RadioShack’s Attempts To Sell Customer Data Meets [sic] Resis-
tance, FORBES (May 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/LB5S-KY7R.
23. Agin, Handling, supra note 10, at 60; see also Henry Lebowitz & Benjamin Sundholm, Privacy
Policies and the Value of Data in Bankruptcy Sales, IPWATCHDOG.COM (Jan. 15, 2020), https://
perma.cc/7TTD-MWM2 (last visited Sept. 8, 2020) (citing the General Data Protection Regulation and
California Consumer Privacy Act as two other laws that must be followed).
24. Lebowitz and Sundholm, supra note 23 (citing the RadioShack settlement as lessening the
value of the data because it “reduced the data points available for purchasers’ business purposes”).
25. Id. (noting that it is difficult to predict courts’ willingness to permit data sales given more
explicit requirements in recent European and California privacy laws regarding personal data transfers).
26. Maria Korolov, California Consumer Privacy Act [CCPA]: What You Need to Know to be
Compliant, CSO (July 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/T3L2-Z3NU.
27. Lebowitz and Sundholm, supra note 23. (“[P]rivacy policies can be drafted to mitigate the risk
of losing value in a sale of distressed data assets.”).
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mart”), after the company attempted to sell its customer data in bankruptcy,
in violation of its privacy policy.28 Toysmart, a once-popular online retailer
for children’s toys, had previously announced it was closing operations and
would sell its assets.29 Toysmart’s creditors subsequently put the company
into bankruptcy proceedings.30 The FTC alleged Toysmart was attempting
to sell “personally identifiable information” (“PII”), including the names
and birthdates of children, in violation of both COPPA and Toysmart’s own
privacy policy.31
The FTC’s complaint alleged Toysmart had collected information
from children under thirteen years of age without either notifying their par-
ents or obtaining parental consent.32 The FTC also took issue with Toys-
mart’s attempt to sell its customer data in direct violation of its own privacy
policy, which stated the company would never share customer information
with third parties.33 Jodie Bernstein, then the director of the FTC’s Bureau
of Consumer Protection, stated, “Customer data collected under a privacy
agreement should not be auctioned off to the highest bidder.”34
Ultimately, the FTC and Toysmart settled their differences, with the
FTC voting 3-2 to approve the settlement.35 In approving the settlement,
FTC Commissioner Mozelle Thompson issued a separate statement that ex-
pressed his reservations with the settlement.36 Specifically, Commissioner
Thompson believed “consumers would benefit from notice and choice
before a company transfers their information to a corporate successor.”37
However, the settlement did provide that any successor-in-interest would
have to maintain the terms of Toysmart’s original privacy policy, and ulti-
mately, Commissioner Thompson voted to approve the settlement.38
28. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Announces Settlement with Bankrupt Website,
Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy Violations (July 21, 2000), https://perma.cc/QS2Z-
75Z4 [hereinafter Settlement Announcement].
29. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Sues Failed Website, Toysmart.com, for De-
ceptively Offering for Sale Personal Information of Website Visitors (July 10, 2000), https://perma.cc/
2T85-6X6Z.
30. Id.
31. Settlement Announcement, supra note 28.
32. Id.
33. Toysmart’s privacy policy stated, “Personal information voluntarily submitted by visitors to our
site, such as name, address, billing information and shopping preferences, is never shared with a third
party. . .When you register with toysmart.com, you can rest assured that your information will never be
shared with a third party.” Stipulation and Order Establishing Conditions on Sale of Customer Informa-
tion, In re Toysmart.com, Case No. 00-13995-CJK (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000), https://perma.cc/8DUS-
MFMG.
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The Toysmart settlement articulated several guidelines for the sale of
customer information in violation of a company’s stated privacy policy.
First, it provided Toysmart’s data and customer lists could not be sold as a
stand-alone asset.39 Rather, they had to be sold as a package with other
assets, including Toysmart’s website.40 The settlement further specified the
data could be sold only to a “Qualified Buyer,” defined by the FTC as “an
entity that is in a related market and that expressly agrees to be Toysmart’s
successor-in-interest as to the customer information.”41 As stated, the Qual-
ified Buyer had to keep the terms of Toysmart’s privacy statement; if it
sought to change those terms, it could not change the use of the customer
information it had purchased from Toysmart unless it provided notice and
obtained the relevant consumers’ affirmative (“opt-in”) consent to those
new uses.42 Additionally, though not an official part of the settlement, FTC
Commissioner Thompson wrote separately to encourage “any successor to
provide Toysmart customers with notice and an opportunity to ‘opt out’ as a
matter of good will and business practice.”43
The Toysmart settlement may have placated the FTC, but it did not end
Toysmart’s troubles. Several state attorneys general objected to the settle-
ment in bankruptcy court, arguing Toysmart’s proposed asset sale still con-
stituted an unfair or deceptive business practice under state laws.44 After the
bankruptcy court refused to approve the settlement with the FTC, Toysmart
withdrew its customer information from the auction.45
Although the FTC settlement did not result in Toysmart selling its cus-
tomer lists, it lived on as a model for other companies seeking to sell cus-
tomer information in bankruptcy. In the months and years following the
Toysmart settlement, many debtors mimicked the settlement’s terms, with
some going further to include Commissioner Thompson’s suggestion of an






44. Randi Singer, Olivia Greer & Eliza Cotter, Transferring Personally Identifiable Information in
Bankruptcy M&A, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Aug. 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/Q7W6-HJD3.
45. Id.
46. CPO reports also commonly make the “opt out” recommendation today. See, e.g., Report of
Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, Alan Chapell at 27, In re General Motors Corp, et al., Case No. 09-
50026 (2011), available at https://perma.cc/DV8W-ZW96 (“Debtor and New GM agree to provide con-
sumers with an opportunity to opt out of being contacted by New GM for marketing purposes and an
opportunity to opt-out of having information transferred to another dealer.”) (emphasis omitted); Report
of Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, James P.S. Leshaw at 3, In re Adinath Corp. Simply Fashion Stores,
Ltd., Case No. 15-16885 (2015), available at https://perma.cc/MQ7L-B746 (recommending that, if the
debtor does not sell to a qualified buyer, consumers be given the chance to opt out of communications
from the buyer).
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ment with the Texas Attorney General, online retailer Living.com was per-
mitted to pursue a sale of its customer data, on the condition that it permit-
ted customers to opt out of the transfer of their data to the buyer.47
The following year, eToys, Inc. went beyond an opt-out policy after
multiple state attorneys general objected to its attempted sale in bankruptcy
of customer data in express violation of its privacy policy.48 The eventual
settlement included a requirement that customers opt in to the use of their
data by the purchaser, KB Consolidated, Inc.49 By requiring affirmative
consumer consent, this “opt-in” notice ensured more customer notice and
consent than the opt-out policy favored in previous settlements. In addition,
even those who opted in to use of their data by the purchaser could rest
assured their credit card information would not be transferred.50
Not every company embraced opt-in and opt-out policies, however.
Notably, in 2002, Egghead.com, Inc. sought to sell its assets to Fry’s Elec-
tronics, Inc. Fry’s proposed a sort of hybrid “opt-out” plan, under which
Fry’s required that “no more than ten percent of active customers—anyone
who bought something at Egghead in the last two years—can ‘opt out’ of a
plan to transfer their information over to Fry’s Electronics.”51 Critics of the
proposal called it “wrong and on shaky legal ground,” because Egghead had
previously stated it would not disclose customer information; therefore, pri-
vacy advocates argued customers needed to affirmatively opt in to any
transfer.52 The deal with Fry’s ultimately fell through, and Amazon, which
agreed to honor Egghead’s privacy policy, purchased Egghead instead.53
As it became clear that an increasing number of companies were seek-
ing to sell customer information in bankruptcy—thereby attracting the op-
position of the FTC, state attorneys general, and other consumer advo-
cates—Congress also took notice. In 2005, Congress revised the Bank-
ruptcy Code and sought to better protect consumer privacy interests in
bankruptcy sales.54 The CPO was a key element of this increased protec-
tion.
47. Robert Brady, Sean Beach & Karen B. Skomorucha, Determining and Preserving the Assets of
Dot-Coms, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 185, 192 (2003).




51. Egghead Sale Could Crack on Privacy Issues, CNET (Jan. 2, 2002, 4:43 PM), https://perma.cc/
8QUD-9M75.
52. Id. (quoting privacy advocate Jason Catlett).
53. Alorie Gilbert, Egghead.com Bounces Back Under Amazon, CNET (Jan. 2, 2002, 4:43PM),
https://perma.cc/FW73-999R.
54. Daniel Brian Tan, Maximizing the Value of Privacy through Judicial Discretion 34 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 681, 696 (2018).
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B. BAPCPA and the CPO
In 2005, in response to a growing number of concerns about the acces-
sibility and efficacy of the bankruptcy system, Congress passed the Bank-
ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”).55
BAPCPA represented an extensive set of amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code. These amendments included two provisions relating to the sale of
customer data in bankruptcy: 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1) and 332.
Section 363(b)(1) applies if the debtor has a privacy policy and the
debtor-in-possession or trustee in bankruptcy wants to sell or lease PII dur-
ing the bankruptcy case.56 It provides that a sale or lease of PII cannot occur
unless it is consistent with the debtor’s privacy policy or a CPO is ap-
pointed and the bankruptcy court, after notice and a hearing, approves the
sale or lease.57
Importantly, the Bankruptcy Code has its own, somewhat narrow defi-
nition of PII. Broadly speaking, the Code defines PII as information pro-
vided by an individual to the debtor in connection with obtaining a product
or service from the debtor primarily for personal, family, or household pur-
poses.58 Practically speaking, this definition excludes a wide swath of what
may be considered PII by other law or in lay terms. For example, consumer
information that the debtor obtains from another company does not consti-
tute PII, because presumably, the other company did not obtain a product or
service from the debtor primarily for personal, family, or household use in
exchange for providing that information.
Section 332 provides for the appointment of a consumer privacy
ombudsman.59 Specifically, if a hearing is required per § 363(b)(1)(B), the
bankruptcy court must order the United States Trustee (U.S. Trustee) to
55. Id. (“BAPCPA amended the Code to address privacy concerns and system abuse.”).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2018).
57. Id. The exact language of § 363(b)(1) is as follows: “The trustee, after notice and a hearing,
may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate, except that if
the debtor in connection with offering a product or a service discloses to an individual a policy prohibit-
ing the transfer of personally identifiable information about individuals to persons that are not affiliated
with the debtor and if such policy is in effect on the date of the commencement of the case, then the
trustee may not sell or lease personally identifiable information to any person unless (A) such sale or
such lease is consistent with such policy; or (B) after appointment of a consumer privacy ombudsman in
accordance with section 332, and after notice and a hearing, the court approves such sale or such lease
(i) giving due consideration to the facts, circumstances, and conditions of such sale or such lease; and
(ii) finding that no showing was made that such sale or such lease would violate applicable nonban-
kruptcy law.”
58. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41A).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 332.
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appoint a CPO.60 The CPO must be appointed “not later than 7 days before
the commencement of the hearing” and must be a “disinterested person.”61
Section 332 further provides that the CPO may appear and be heard at the
hearing contemplated by § 363(b)(1)(B) and must provide information to
assist the court in its consideration of the “facts, circumstances, and condi-
tions” of the proposed PII sale or lease.62
Thus, under these provisions, a debtor may not sell PII in violation of
its privacy policy unless the court approves the sale after the U.S. Trustee
has appointed a CPO to review the terms. The amendments thus contem-
plate the CPO taking on a role similar to that of the FTC and state attorneys
general—the CPO assesses “potential losses or gains of privacy to consum-
ers” as well as the potential costs or benefits to them.63 In practice, PII sales
occurring pursuant to these amendments follow very similar requirements
as those the FTC imposed in the Toysmart settlement.64
Information-gathering is critical to the CPO’s role. In some cases,
CPOs have considered not just the debtor’s current privacy policies, but
other policies predating the current one that were disclosed to consumers at
the time the debtor gathered their information.65
The Bankruptcy Code gives CPOs only a short time period in which to
perform their role of gathering and assessing information and creating a
report to the court. Initially, § 332 provided for the CPO’s appointment a
mere five days prior to the hearing.66 Now, the CPO must be appointed at
least seven days before the hearing. Given the large amount of information
a CPO must gather, review, and write about in order to make a recommen-
dation to the court, seven days is a very short time period indeed.67
60. 11 U.S.C. § 332(a); see also Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 6004(g)(1) (requiring a motion requesting an
order directing the U.S. Trustee to appoint a CPO); Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 6004(g)(2) (requiring the U.S.
Trustee to file a notice of CPO appointment accompanied by a verified statement of disinterestedness).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 332(a).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 332(b).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 332(b)(2), (3); Tan, supra note 54, at 697 (“Just as the FTC advised the court in
Toysmart, BAPCPA intended the consumer privacy ombudsman to serve a similar advisory role.”).
64. Tan, supra note 54, at 696–97 (comparing BAPCPA’s provisions with those the FTC required
in the Toysmart case); Wedoff & Saunders, supra note 17, at 50.
65. See Report of Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, In re Gen. Motors, No. 09-50026 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Jul. 1, 2009) at 22–23 (considering GM’s current and historic policies).
66. Agin, Handling, supra note 10, at 59 (“The court must give the ombudsman at least five days to
prepare his or her report.”).
67. Id. at 60 (noting the CPO “will have to know, in advance, what information he needs to do his
job, where to find that information within a business entity and how to communicate his needs to the
debtor and buyer”); Reply of Michael St. Patrick Baxter, Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, to Objection
of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to First Interim Fee Application and Second and Third
Monthly Fee Statements at 5, In re Borders Group, Inc., Case No. 11-10614 (Nov. 23, 2011) [hereinaf-
ter Baxter Reply] (“Upon my appointment as ombudsman. . .I was presented with a severely compressed
timeframe. . ..”).
10
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According to commentators, “[a] consumer privacy ombudsman
should help the court understand the effect of the [proposed] sale on cus-
tomers and help the parties restructure the sale if necessary so it is fair to
customers.”68 In essence, the goal of the CPO is to advise the court with
respect to consumer data and privacy, and to provide protection for cus-
tomer data in bankruptcy.69 How, exactly, the CPO is to accomplish this
goal is left largely up to the parties and the CPO. The language of the
Bankruptcy Code does not define the CPO’s role in the sale process other
than to provide some nonexclusive suggestions about information the CPO
may present to the court.70 Thus, whether and how the CPO adequately
protects customer privacy is dependent, to a significant degree, on who the
CPO is and whether they are equipped to take an active and thorough role
in the bankruptcy case.
Importantly, the Bankruptcy Code does not require the court to appoint
a CPO in every instance where a debtor seeks to sell PII. Instead, the “fact
patterns requiring the ombudsman’s involvement seem to fall in between
those where the sale is consistent with the privacy policy and those where
the sale is illegal.”71 Furthermore, if the customer information the debtor is
seeking to sell is not “personally identifiable information” as defined in the
Bankruptcy Code,72 if the debtor does not have a policy with respect to PII
in place, or if the court determines that the proposed sale or lease is consis-
tent with the debtor’s policy, there is no statutory need for a CPO.73
Although the Bankruptcy Code now provides some protection for cus-
tomers when their information is sold by a company to a third party,
BAPCPA’s added provisions arguably did not go far enough in protecting
consumer privacy, particularly given the pace at which data-collection tech-
nology has progressed.74 As discussed, in practice, BAPCPA’s protections
often end up looking very similar to those the FTC sought to impose in the
Toysmart settlement—a settlement that received only lukewarm support
within the FTC and that was ultimately deemed insufficiently protective by
the bankruptcy court and state attorneys general. As indicated in the Intro-
duction, scholars who have studied CPOs often conclude that consumers
68. Agin, Handling, supra note 10, at 60.
69. Wedoff & Saunders, supra note 17, at 15.
70. See 11 U.S.C. § 332(b)(1)–(4) (2018); Agin, Handling, supra note 10, at 60 (“The
ombudsman’s role in the sale process is far from clear given the statute’s language.”).
71. Agin, Handling, supra note 10, at 60.
72. The Bankruptcy Code’s definition for PII can be found in 11 U.S.C. § 101(41A) and is limited
to, inter alia, information “provided by an individual to the debtor in connection with obtaining a prod-
uct or a service from the debtor primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(41A)(A).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1).
74. Tan, supra note 54, at 697 (“Although BAPCPA contains measures to protect consumer pri-
vacy, technology has outpaced those protections.”).
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could benefit from both more substantive CPO involvement and CPO in-
volvement in a higher number of cases.
The Bankruptcy Code’s limited protections for customer data trans-
ferred through an asset sale, combined with the Code’s lack of guidance and
specificity about the CPO’s work, suggest that the efficacy of the CPO de-
pends largely on who is inhabiting that role. And there is good reason to
think that the CPO’s work in assessing and protecting consumer privacy
will become increasingly important. For example, courts must also consider
a sale’s compliance with other, non-bankruptcy privacy laws. A court may
turn to a CPO to help it assess this compliance.75
As global concerns over the use of customer data increase, non-bank-
ruptcy privacy laws are likely to become more ubiquitous. For example, in
2018, California passed the CCPA, which “allows any California consumer
to demand to see all the information a company has saved on them, as well
as a full list of all the third parties that data is shared with.”76 Under the
CCPA, consumers can sue companies that violate privacy guidelines, even
if there is no data breach.77 The CCPA only came into effect in July of
2020, but it is expected to have significant repercussions for numerous
companies.78
A CPO can help the bankruptcy court understand and address con-
sumer privacy concerns arising in an asset sale, as well as the sale’s compli-
ance with both the debtor’s own privacy policy and non-bankruptcy law.
Part III discusses the CPO’s role in some high-profile bankruptcy cases and
critically assesses the process surrounding CPO appointments.
III. CPOS: PRACTICE AND PROCESS
This Part examines CPOs in practice: who they are, what they do, and
how they interact with the bankruptcy court. It posits that more attention
should be paid to how CPOs are chosen and whether they are qualified for
the tasks they must perform in a bankruptcy case, before concluding with
some specific suggestions regarding CPO selection.
75. Wedoff & Saunders, supra note 17, at 50 (concluding that “a bankruptcy court likely has au-
thority to appoint a CPO to opine on a proposed sale’s compliance with applicable nonbankruptcy law
and its effect on consumer privacy” even if the sale does not involve PII as defined in the Bankruptcy
Code).
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A. Case Law
As discussed in Part II, the Bankruptcy Code leaves something to be
desired when it comes to describing the role of the CPO and the standards
to which sales of customer data should be held. However, in practice, many
CPOs have risen to the task of protecting customer data, producing substan-
tial, detailed reports in a short amount of time and alerting the court if the
sale parties risk running afoul of privacy laws and policies.79 Sometimes, a
CPO can stand between the debtor and a completed sale.80 In addition, al-
though a court may reject the CPO’s recommendations,81 in practice, bank-
ruptcy courts appear to give deference to CPO reports.82 All of this suggests
that the identity of the CPO matters a great deal. The short time period in
which the CPO must create a report means the CPO has little time to get up
to speed on either privacy or bankruptcy law. And with multimillion-dollar
asset sales on the line, parties will have little tolerance for CPOs that make
mistakes.
As an example of the active and persuasive role CPOs can play in a
bankruptcy case, consider the CPO in the Borders bankruptcy, Michael St.
Patrick Baxter. From the time of his appointment, Baxter engaged in an
ongoing dialogue with the purchaser of Borders’s assets, Barnes & Noble
(“B&N”), in order to structure the sale in a way that respected the privacy
of Borders’s former customers.83 His initial court report outlined his con-
cerns over possible privacy violations and suggested ways to address those
concerns, including allowing consumers to opt out of the transfer of their
data.84 B&N did provide an opt-out notice to consumers; however, Baxter
believed it deficient because it “failed to provide important information to
enable Borders customers to make an informed decision about whether to
opt out.”85 Baxter then filed a supplemental report expressing these con-
79. See, e.g., Report of Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, In re General Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-50026) (83-page report, including analysis of debtors’ privacy policies
and practices and recommendations).
80. See, e.g., Baxter Reply supra note 67, at 6–7 (noting the court’s refusal to approve sale based
upon issues raised in CPO report).
81. Walter W. Miller, Jr. & Maureen A. O’Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy Rights: Which
Holds the Trump Card?, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 845 (2001).
82. See Baxter Reply, supra note 67, at 6–7; see also Order (1) Authorizing Sale of Assets Free and
Clear of Interests, (2) Authorizing the Assumption and Assignment of Contracts and Leases, (3) Waiv-
ing Any Temporary Stay of Relief, and (4) Granting Other Relief at 9, In re Big Nevada, Inc., https://
perma.cc/794C-VXXD (Bankr. W.D. Wash May 27, 2010) (No. 09-13569) [hereinafter Order Authoriz-
ing Sale of Big Nevada Assets] (adopting the CPO’s report and recommendations).
83. See Supplemental Report of Michael St. Patrick Baxter Consumer Privacy Ombudsman 2–3, In
re Borders Group, Inc., (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2011) (No. 11-10614) [hereinafter Baxter Supplemen-
tal Report].
84. See id. at 2 (“It was clear to the Ombudsman that a robust and meaningful opt-out was critical
to reaching the negotiated privacy related terms of the Sale.”).
85. Id. at 3.
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cerns to the court.86 Upon reading the supplemental report, the bankruptcy
court refused to allow the sale to proceed until B&N satisfied Baxter’s pri-
vacy concerns.87 Ultimately, B&N agreed to send customers an “opt-out”
email, giving customers a period of time to opt out of the transfer of their
data.88 The court in Borders gave great deference to the CPO’s report, con-
ditioning its own sale approval on the buyer’s compliance with the CPO’s
recommendations. The Borders case shows how an active CPO can influ-
ence the conditions of a sale and can even stand in the way of a sale occur-
ring.
In practice, CPOs can also serve as an intermediary of sorts for other
consumer advocates to express concerns about a bankruptcy sale. For exam-
ple, in 2015, the FTC and 37 state attorneys general became concerned after
RadioShack proposed to sell the PII of its 117 million customers, represent-
ing nearly 37% of the entire U.S. population.89 Jessica Rich, the director of
the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, sent a letter to the CPO, Elise
Frejka, expressing the FTC’s concerns about the sale and providing gui-
dance on how to best protect customer data.90 Rich’s letter reiterated the
Toysmart settlement guidelines and suggested that if RadioShack did not
receive its customers’ affirmative consent to sell their information, the sale
would need to satisfy four conditions: (1) customer data could not be sold
as a standalone asset; (2) the buyer would need to be involved in substan-
tially the same lines of business as RadioShack; (3) the buyer would need to
expressly agree to be bound by RadioShack’s privacy policy; and (4) the
buyer would need to obtain the affirmative consent of RadioShack’s cus-
tomers if making any material changes to the privacy policy.91 In her report
to the court, Frejka included these guidelines but went a step further, rec-
ommending that the parties provide an “opt-out notice” to customers, simi-
lar to what the Borders ombudsman requested, to allow customers to make
an informed decision about the use of their data.92 Ultimately, RadioShack
ended up paring down the amount of customer data that it sold, providing
86. Id.
87. Baxter Reply, supra note 67, at 6–7.
88. Baxter remained unhappy with the wording of Barnes & Noble’s email, however, and vigor-
ously sought to change it, despite having only a two-hour deadline to do so. Barnes & Noble Email to
Borders Customers Rattles Privacy Watchdog, REUTERS, available at https://perma.cc/YD56-DKU4
(last visited Sept. 19, 2020).
89. Gavrila A. Brotz, RadioShacks Consumer Data: A Highly Scrutinized Asset, TACHE, BRONIS,
CHRISTIANSON & DESCALZO, P.A. (June 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/P3NQ-P8WX.
90. See Letter from Jessica L. Rich, Dir. of Bureau of Consumer Prot., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to
Elise Frejka, Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, In Re: RadioShack Corporation, et al., No. 15-10197
(BLS) (Bankr. D. Del.),  https://perma.cc/UYW7-84XD [hereinafter Rich Letter].
91. Id. at 5.
92. Report of the Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, Elise Frejka at 2–4, In re Radioshack Corp.,
(Bankr. D. Del. May 16, 2015) (No. 15-10197) available at https://perma.cc/G6LN-9GY9Zxb8Fz (last
visited Sept. 19, 2020).
14
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only the email addresses of customers “who specifically requested informa-
tion from RadioShack during the past two years.”93 RadioShack illustrates
how the CPO can work with other consumer advocates to protect customer
data while allowing the sale to proceed.
On occasion, however, court deference to CPOs can result in fewer
protections for consumer interests. For example, in In re Big Nevada, Inc.,94
CPO Wesley Avery was appointed but determined that the customer data
the debtor was selling likely did not fall within the Bankruptcy Code’s defi-
nition of PII.95  The debtor had collected customer information in connec-
tion with a points program that rewarded customers for visiting the debtor’s
casinos.96 However, because customers were not required to provide the
information in order to gamble, Avery determined that the information was
not PII because it was not “provided. . .to the debtor in connection with
obtaining a product or service.”97 The CPO’s conclusion that the data did
not constitute PII is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the Bank-
ruptcy Code’s definition of the term; however, because of the Bankruptcy
Code’s arguably narrow definition of PII,98 the debtor was able to complete
the sale with comparatively little scrutiny of  the overall privacy impact on
customers. The Big Nevada court performed no independent analysis of the
issue; instead, it took the CPO’s report at face value and adopted his recom-
mendations without further comment or scrutiny.99
A review of some of the cases indicates that CPOs can play important
roles in identifying risks to customer privacy, working with others to assess
the severity of the risks, and finding ways to mitigate those risks. A diligent
CPO can serve as a check on parties seeking to shortcut privacy interests in
order to accomplish a sale, and CPO reports appear to be taken seriously by
the courts. But who exactly are CPOs? What are their qualifications, and
what process, if any, do they go through before becoming a CPO? The next
section turns to these questions.
B. Unmasking the CPO
As the proliferation of non-bankruptcy privacy regulations indi-
cates,100 it is becoming increasingly critical to safeguard consumer privacy
93. Brotz, supra note 89.
94. No. 09-13569 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. May 26, 2010).
95. Report of Consumer Privacy Ombudsman at 4, In re Big Nevada, Inc., https://perma.cc/FND8-
N6EU (Bankr. W.D. Wash. May 26, 2010) (No. 09-13569) [hereinafter Big Nevada Report].
96. Id. at 2–3.
97. Id. at 4.
98. Wedoff & Saunders, supra note 17, at 49.
99. Order Authorizing Sale of Big Nevada Assets, supra note 82, at 9.
100. Venky Anant, et al., The Consumer-Data Opportunity and the Privacy Imperative, MCKINSEY
& CO. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/8S5V-BJ8Q (“Proliferating breaches and the demand of con-
15
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interests. A CPO may have no more than seven days from the time of ap-
pointment to scrutinize the debtor’s privacy policy, assess the customer in-
formation the debtor has collected, and determine the privacy interests at
stake in a potential data sale. As the entity designated to protect consumer
privacy in a bankruptcy case, the CPO’s qualifications should matter. Nev-
ertheless, to date, no one has analyzed the qualifications or selection
processes for CPOs.
This Article begins to fill that gap. An examination of some of the
most significant bankruptcy cases with CPO appointments reveals the iden-
tities and qualifications of the CPOs chosen in those cases. Two themes
emerge from the cases. First, CPOs tend to be repeat players. Many have
been appointed in multiple bankruptcy cases, usually clustered around a
particular geographic area. Second, although there appear to be no firm
qualifications for a CPO, many CPOs have a privacy specialist certification.
1. Repeat Players
Many CPOs have experience serving as CPOs in multiple cases. For
example, Michael St. Patrick Baxter, discussed above in connection with
the Borders case, also served as the CPO in the Performance Sports Group
bankruptcy,101 a 2017 case where the debtor sold nearly all of its assets to
an investor group.102 Baxter also served as CPO for the bankruptcy sale of
World Egg Bank’s donor eggs and medical records.103 Similarly, Elise
Frejka, the RadioShack CPO, has been a CPO in at least nine high-profile
bankruptcy cases, including Toys “R” Us, Inc. and Wet Seal.104 Other
prominent repeat players include Lucy Thomson, a CPO in 25 bankruptcy
cases, including “Circuit City, Coach, True.com, Linens N Things, Mattress
Discounters, and J.K. Harris,”105 and Alan Chapell, a CPO in over 25 bank-
ruptcy cases, “including General Motors, Chrysler, Eddie Bauer, Atari and
St. Vincent’s hospitals.”106 In the Pacific Northwest and California region,
Wesley Avery has served as CPO in at least 12 bankruptcy cases, including
sumers for privacy and control of their own data have led governments to adopt new regulations, such as
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe and the California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA) in that US state. Many others are following suit.”).
101. Michael St. Patrick Baxter, COVINGTON, https://perma.cc/W2WQ-2VLY [hereinafter Baxter
Bio].
102. Press Release, Performance Sports Group Completes Sale of Substantially All of its Assets to
Investor Group Led by Sagard and Fairfax Financial, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 28, 2017),  https://perma.cc/
F4C7-LWM5.
103. Baxter Bio, supra note 101.
104. Elise S. Frejka, CIPP/US, FREJKA PLLC, https://perma.cc/WY7A-97Z6 [hereinafter Frejka
Bio].
105. Lucy L. Thomson, Esq. CISSP, LINKEDIN, https://perma.cc/3H96-QFWP [hereinafter Thomson
Bio].
106. Chapell & Associates, CHAPELLASSOCIATES.COM, https://perma.cc/B7XP-CYD7.
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In re Big Nevada, In re Northwest Health Systems, In re X10 Wireless, and
In re The Tulving Company.107
Not all CPOs are repeat players, however. For example, Jim Leshaw, a
commercial lawyer in Miami, appears to have been the CPO for only one
case out of the Southern District of Florida.108 Donald Gaffney, the first
CPO ever appointed, was not subsequently appointed as a CPO in any other
case.109
Still, it is clear that many CPOs are appointed in case after case. Un-
doubtedly, appointments in multiple cases allow the individuals appointed
to gain experience and further develop their expertise. On the other hand,
there is a risk that a CPO will be appointed repeatedly because of inertia
and not because they are a particularly good fit for the case at hand. In some
cases, it may be helpful for the CPO to understand the debtor’s business or
industry so that they can better understand how the debtor collects and uses
customer information. CPOs appointed in a wide variety of cases may not
have this desired industry-specific background.
Another concern can arise when a CPO is appointed simply because
they can work quickly. In a bankruptcy, neither the debtor nor its creditors
are likely to embrace the idea of a CPO appointment, “because it causes a
delay in the sale process and accounts for the subtraction of a large adminis-
trative expense from the [ ] debtor’s estate.”110 For these reasons, a CPO
who can work quickly is likely to receive less resistance from the parties
than a CPO who must take time to learn the ropes. Pressure or resistance
from the debtor and other parties to the case, coupled with the short time
window in between a CPO’s appointment and production of their report,111
has the potential to create pressure on the CPO to cut corners. Thus, work-
ing quickly may not always equate to working well.
In short, although there are advantages to appointing CPOs in case
after case, those advantages should be taken in stride with other considera-
tions, such as the desirability of a CPO with industry knowledge, even if
that CPO has little to no experience as a CPO in other bankruptcy cases.
107. Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, THEBANKRUPTCYLAWCENTERS.COM, https://perma.cc/K6FG-
SDME [hereinafter Avery Bio].
108. Report of Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, In re Adinath Corp., (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jul. 29, 2015)
(No. 15-16885-LMI), available at https://perma.cc/XJ4Z-J9YE.
109. Keeping Up with Technology Section 332 and the Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, AM. BANKR.
INST. J. (Sept. 2006), available at https://perma.cc/HR8V-Y27W (last visited Sept. 19, 2020).
110. Siam, supra note 10, at 511.
111. See Keeping Up with Technology, supra note 109 (noting that Gaffney was appointed a mere 10
days before the scheduled sale hearing, although the hearing was later delayed, giving him 16 days from
his appointment “to complete the investigation, analysis and drafting of the CPO’s report”).
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2. Privacy Specialist Designations
In addition to being repeat players, some of the CPOs in the cases
studied held industry certifications designating them as privacy specialists.
For example, both Elise Frejka and Wesley Avery hold the title of Certified
Information Privacy Professional (“CIPP”), which is a designation awarded
by the International Association of Privacy Professionals, an organization
accredited by the American Bar Association.112 To earn this designation,
candidates must pass a 90-question exam on privacy law.113 Lucy Thomson
is a Certified Information Systems Security Professional, a certification
granted by the International System Security Certification Consortium.114
Overall, however, the experiences and certifications of the CPOs stud-
ied are mixed. For example, although Alan Chapell does not hold a privacy
specialist designation, he is clearly experienced in the privacy realm. He has
served as chief privacy officer and outside counsel for over 100 technology
companies and regularly lectures on privacy issues.115 Other CPOs, such as
Michael St. Patrick Baxter and Jim Leshaw, are primarily bankruptcy law-
yers that have served as CPOs on occasion.116
An examination of these CPOs indicates that there is no one route to
becoming a CPO, and there is no particular baseline qualification, such as a
certification of some kind. Some CPOs, such as Thomson, have little to no
bankruptcy experience beyond their time in bankruptcy court as CPOs.117
Others, such as Baxter and Leshaw, are known primarily for their bank-
ruptcy expertise, rather than their privacy law experience.118 Because the
Bankruptcy Code provides no qualifications for a CPO other than that they
be “disinterested,” a wide range of people may be qualified for a CPO ap-
pointment in any given case.
On the one hand, a lack of formal qualifications for a CPO opens the
field to prospective candidates who may have unique experiences that qual-
ify them to be CPOs even though they lack a formal privacy or bankruptcy
designation. For example, CPOs may be familiar with the practice in a
112. Frejka Bio, supra note 104; Avery Bio, supra note 105; CIPP Certification, IAPP.ORG, https://
perma.cc/D8WX-VC7A; Privacy Law Specialist, IAPP.ORG, https://perma.cc/H28B-HP9D (“The IAPP
is accredited by the American Bar Association to certify lawyers in the specialty area of Privacy Law.”).
113. IAPP Privacy Certification Candidate Handbook 2020 at 4, IAPP.ORG (2020), https://perma.cc/
79UB-EJQC.
114. Thomson Bio, supra note 105.
115. Alan Chapell, LINKEDIN.COM, https://perma.cc/2QYT-S3VT.
116. Baxter Bio, supra note 101 (“Michael St. Patrick Baxter solves problems for clients involved in
insolvency or bankruptcy situations.”); Overview, LESHAWLAW.COM, https://perma.cc/9DGY-GE47
[hereinafter Leshaw Bio] (“Jim Leshaw has more than 30 years of experience as a commercial lawyer
handling complex domestic and international business disputes and transactions . . . .”).
117. Thomson Bio, supra note 105.
118. Baxter Bio, supra note 101; Leshaw Bio, supra note 115.
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given court, or they may be knowledgeable about the business that is for
sale. On the other hand, having virtually no standards for choosing a CPO
creates the possibility that an individual with no privacy or bankruptcy ex-
pertise could fill the CPO’s shoes. Whether or not this is likely to occur
depends in part on the CPO selection process, of which little is known.
C. Proposal: More Criteria and Transparency for CPO Appointments
The bankruptcy system demands a great deal of CPOs: they must com-
prehensively assess the risks and benefits of the sale of customer data—
frequently a company’s most valuable asset—often in a very short window
of time. Given the importance of the CPO’s work, the background and qual-
ifications of a potential CPO should matter a great deal, because a CPO
with extensive knowledge of the relevant privacy and bankruptcy issues at
stake will enter a case on a much stronger footing than an individual with-
out such knowledge. However, little information exists about what, if any,
substantive qualifications an individual must possess before being ap-
pointed as a CPO, and the Bankruptcy Code’s sole requirement—that a
CPO be “disinterested”—does not speak at all to the CPO’s skill set. In
addition, as discussed, although many CPOs appointed to date have shared
characteristics, there is an unevenness in the people appointed to the posi-
tion. Some are bankruptcy experts, some are privacy experts, and some are
both. Some have substantial experience as a CPO, while others have com-
paratively little.
This Article suggests that further CPO qualifications, beyond disinter-
estedness, should be developed and made publicly available as guidelines
for choosing a CPO in any bankruptcy case. Development and publication
of these guidelines could occur in a number of ways. Congress could amend
the Bankruptcy Code to add CPO qualifications or baseline standards di-
rectly to § 332. Alternatively, either the FTC or the Department of Justice
could issue such guidelines.
Commentators have increasingly called for more changes to the Bank-
ruptcy Code’s provisions surrounding customer data, arguing that the cur-
rent provisions do not go far enough.119 If Congress heeds these calls and
amends the Bankruptcy Code to broaden the scope of cases where a CPO is
needed, it could include qualifications for the CPO as part of those amend-
ments. Specifically, Congress could amend §332 directly to list qualifica-
tions for a CPO that go beyond disinterestedness.
Of course, it is far from clear that a Bankruptcy Code amendment of
this type would be forthcoming. Congress has not substantially modified the
Bankruptcy Code provisions surrounding customer data sales since they
119. Wedoff & Saunders, supra note 17, at 49, 51.
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have been enacted.120 Further, including qualifications as part of the Bank-
ruptcy Code’s statutory scheme may impede flexibility, as well as the U.S.
Trustee’s discretion to select a CPO that is well-matched for a particular
case.
As an alternative to a statutory amendment, the FTC could issue guide-
lines.121 The FTC conducts 10-year reviews of each of its rules and guides,
so standards for CPO qualifications could periodically be updated and ad-
justed as needed.122 The FTC was initially heavily involved in creating
guidelines for the sale of PII through cases such as Toysmart, and it contin-
ues to monitor PII sales in bankruptcy today.123 Further, as discussed above,
BAPCPA contemplated the CPO taking on a role similar to the FTC’s role
in bankruptcy data sales prior to 2005.124 For all of these reasons, the FTC
may be well-suited to issuing guidelines on a CPO’s qualifications.
If the FTC is unable to or otherwise not interested in issuing guide-
lines, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) could do so through Title 28 of the
CFR. The U.S. Trustee Program is part of the DOJ, and the U.S. Trustee
ultimately appoints the CPO to a bankruptcy case.125 The U.S. Trustee
should therefore be well-acquainted with what is needed in a CPO.126 In
addition, the CFR already provides minimum qualifications for other enti-
ties appointed by the U.S. Trustee, such as panel trustees.127
Regardless of which entity or agency issues the qualifications, they
should require any CPO to have significant privacy experience, which can
be demonstrated either through a CIPP designation (or higher), or
equivalent experience. Because the CPO’s primary focus revolves around
scrutiny of privacy laws and policies, a background in privacy law is essen-
tial to understanding how to protect customer data effectively. Indeed, as
advances in technology allow more complex ways of collecting customer
data, and as privacy laws themselves become both more ubiquitous and
complex, it will be critical for anyone in a CPO role to have privacy exper-
120. Although Congress amended § 332 in 2009 to provide that ombudsmen may be appointed no
later than 7 days before a hearing (as opposed to five days), it has not made any changes to § 332 since
that time. See 11 U.S.C. § 332 (2018); Statutory Time-Periods Technical Amendments Act of 2009,
Pub. L. 111-16 (May 7, 2009).
121. See, e.g., Rules and Guides, FTC.GOV, https://perma.cc/72UH-EV3U.
122. Retrospective Review of FTC Rules and Guides, FTC.GOV, https://perma.cc/L6SZ-64E5.
123. Wedoff & Saunders, supra note 17, at 15 (“A number of PII sales have drawn strong opposition
from the FTC, state attorneys general and other creditors.”).
124. See Part II.B, supra.
125. 11 U.S.C. § 332; United States Trustee Program Information, JUSTICE.GOV (Dec. 31, 2020),
https://perma.cc/77TY-77JF.
126. See Baxter, supra note 6, at 13, 15 (noting that the U.S. Trustee often safeguards consumer
information when the FTC is not paying close attention to a case and pointing out that the U.S. Trustee
will appoint a CPO if they believe one is needed).
127. 28 C.F.R. § 58.3 (Westlaw through Feb. 25, 2021).
20
Montana Law Review, Vol. 82 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-1\MON102.txt unknown Seq: 21  9-APR-21 17:17
2021 UNMASKING THE CONSUMER PRIVACY OMBUDSMAN 37
tise. Others involved in the case, such as the U.S. Trustee and the bank-
ruptcy court, are unlikely to have the expertise necessary to accurately as-
sess the privacy law interests inherent in the sale. This is particularly the
case if the FTC does not get involved.
In addition to establishing minimum qualifications for a CPO, it will
be important to make the process for choosing a CPO more transparent as
well. In particular, the U.S. Trustee should consider multiple candidates for
a CPO appointment in any case. This can be done by setting up panels of
CPOs in the various circuits128 and by advertising for interested candidates
to apply for the panels, similar to the way that the U.S. Trustee posts appli-
cations for private trustees.129 Indeed, the U.S. Trustee publishes extensive
information about private trustees, including handbooks, advertisements,
statistics, and qualifications.130
In a 2014 article, the U.S. Trustee’s Office emphasized that the ap-
pointment of a chapter 11 trustee “requires great care.”131 In the case of
chapter 11 trustees, the Bankruptcy Code requires the U.S. Trustee to con-
sult “with parties in interest” prior to making an appointment.132 When the
U.S. Trustee consults with the interested parties, it asks them about the
skills they believe a chapter 11 trustee should possess.133 In seeking a can-
didate with the desired skill set, the U.S. Trustee does not limit itself to
looking only in the district in which the case was filed.134 When appointing
a chapter 11 trustee, the U.S. Trustee looks carefully at candidates’ experi-
ence and qualifications, including their “bankruptcy, financial and business
expertise” and often conducts candidate interviews to ascertain the proper
fit for a case.135 As in the case of chapter 11 trustees, more discussion sur-
rounding the need for CPOs in bankruptcy cases and more transparency
surrounding the selection and appointment processes can arguably contrib-
ute to increased use of the CPO in a bankruptcy case.136
128. There is some indication that some circuits may have established CPO panels. See Porter, supra
note 9, at n. a1 (noting that the author “was appointed to the Consumer Privacy Ombudsman Panel for
the Third Circuit”). However, little information is publicly available about these panels or the process
for being appointed to a panel.
129. See, e.g., Public Notice – Appointment to Panel of Chapter 7 Trustees, JUSTICE.GOV (July 14,
2020), https://perma.cc/8JR6-XFJ8 (advertising vacancies for private trustees).
130. See generally Private Trustee Information, JUSTICE.GOV (Apr. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/
E6PT-HPPJ. Private trustee panel qualifications are provided in 28 C.F.R. § 58.3.
131. Clifford J. White III & Walter W. Theus, Jr., Taking the Mystery Out of the Ch. 11 Trustee
Appointment Process, 33-MAY AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 26 (2014).
132. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(d) (2018).
133. White & Theus, supra, note 131, at 26.
134. Id. at 27.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 110 (“Perhaps more discussion of the need for chapter 11 trustees and less mystery sur-
rounding the selection process can lead to more diligent use of this important tool for sound corporate
governance in bankruptcy cases.”).
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Of course, a CPO is not directly comparable to a private or chapter 11
trustee. Private trustees in particular are involved in vastly more cases, and
their involvement is substantial, as they typically administer the bankruptcy
estate.137 At the same time, the role of a CPO in a bankruptcy case is impor-
tant, particularly if customer data represents a business’s most valuable as-
set. Furthermore, if Congress does amend the Bankruptcy Code to require
the appointment of a CPO in more cases, CPO appointments could become
much more ubiquitous. Finally, every bankruptcy case is different, and the
U.S. Trustee should be able to match a CPO with the desired skill set to the
appropriate case. In this manner, a CPO can be appointed who is familiar
with the industry or type of business at issue.
Notably, in the context of asbestos bankruptcies, the U.S. Trustee has
objected to the appointment of the same future claims representative in mul-
tiple cases. U.S. Trustees have argued that this practice creates an incentive
for future claims representatives “to put future employment ahead of the
interests of future claimants. The idea is that the future claimants’ represen-
tative these lawyers choose will ‘go along to get along’ to the detriment of
future claimants in order to be selected for the next case.”138
The same argument could apply to CPOs: if the same individuals are
appointed to all or even most of the cases in a given region, there may
develop an incentive for them to behave so that they will be hired for the
next case. The U.S. Trustee can address this concern in the CPO context by
providing a transparent appointment process that involves consideration of
multiple candidates, such that a CPO appointed in one case has no clear
guarantee of being appointed in subsequent cases.
Indeed, the bankruptcy court’s response to the U.S. Trustee’s argument
about future claims representatives supports exactly such a process. The
court noted that “[e]xperience and expertise should not be discarded unless
the facts of the case, as developed in a thorough appointment process, raise
concerns about the capabilities of particular candidates.”139 In the CPO con-
text, the extent to which there is a “thorough” appointment process is not
clear. Engaging in such a process and having clear guidance on what mini-
mum qualifications a CPO must possess, would go a long way toward miti-
gating the potential for abuse that the current system provides.
137. Private Trustee Information, supra note 130 (describing the roles and responsibilities of private
trustees).
138. In re Fairbanks Company, 601 B.R. 831, 835 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2019).
139. Id. at 841 (emphasis added).
22
Montana Law Review, Vol. 82 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-1\MON102.txt unknown Seq: 23  9-APR-21 17:17
2021 UNMASKING THE CONSUMER PRIVACY OMBUDSMAN 39
IV. CONCLUSION
A CPO can alter or upend a bankruptcy sale. With this great power
comes an equally great responsibility: CPOs must be able to parse through
massive amounts of information, critically assess the terms of a proposed
data transfer, and apply bankruptcy and privacy laws and policies to the
transfer. This Article maintains that the identity and qualifications of the
CPO matter and proposes that legislators or regulators provide more gui-
dance on this front, in particular by ensuring that a CPO has privacy exper-
tise.
Nothing in this Article is intended to disparage the work of the CPOs
that have been appointed to date. The bulk of the CPOs studied in this paper
were instrumental in protecting customer data transferred as part of a bank-
ruptcy sale. At the same time, the lack of substantive standards for CPO
appointments, as well as the lack of transparency in CPO selection, create
the potential for abuse. And the impact of even one unscrupulous or under-
qualified CPO could be substantial: imagine if the CPO in RadioShack had
allowed customer data to be sold regardless of privacy interests. Over a
third of the entire U.S. population would be affected.
This Article’s proposals represent a portion of a multi-pronged effort
to better protect customer privacy in bankruptcy sales. The suggestions in
this Article, if taken in combination with other proposals, such as increasing
the amount of CPO appointments and broadening the scope of CPO respon-
sibilities, will help to provide more comprehensive protection of and atten-
tion to consumer privacy interests in bankruptcy.
As data privacy laws continue to proliferate, it will be increasingly
important for CPOs to understand those laws and their application in bank-
ruptcy asset sales. It is time to develop public processes and clear qualifica-
tions for CPOs so that they may continue to carry out the increasingly oner-
ous tasks the bankruptcy system imposes on them.
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